Abstract. It has been argued that within a dynamic setting, without complete information, the tax and bribe methods of correcting externalities give asymmetrical results. A model is presented which shows that the bribe alternative under such conditions yields optimal results, whereas the tax alternative does not. This conclusion is the opposite of conclusions drawn from other models advanced in the literature on the subject. It cannot be said that within such a setting one policy is better than the other, since all such conclusions depend upon the particular characteristics of each model. We shall make one more important deviation from Kamien et al. They assume that the amount of waste discharge depends upon the upstream firm output. We shall assume that this is not the case. That is, assume that some activity, necessary for production upstream, causes an amount of discharge •, and that a change in the level of this activity does not change the level of Q•. Several different assumptions about the upstream production process could yield this result. So, whereas Kamien et al. assumed in effect that Q2 was constant and w was a variable, we shall assume that Q2 is a variable and that w is a constant.
the tax and bribe methods of correcting externalities give asymmetrical results. A model is presented which shows that the bribe alternative under such conditions yields optimal results, whereas the tax alternative does not. This conclusion is the opposite of conclusions drawn from other models advanced in the literature on the subject. It cannot be said that within such a setting one policy is better than the other, since all such conclusions depend upon the particular characteristics of each model. (Key words: Quality of water; economics; water msmagement) In their recent article Kamien, Schwartz, and Dolbear [Kamien et al., 1966] produced an example in a 'dynamic setting, which was intended to establish the 'basic asymmetry between bribes and charges. 'x within the context of their model the charge was to be preferred to the bribe, since it would always yield the optimum amount of waste discharge, whereas the bribe would not. By exhibiting a similar model that leads to the opposite conclusion, we show that such short-run asymmetries result from the particular characteristics of each model. Hence one cannot say that the asymmetries resulting from a particular model are We shall make one more important deviation from Kamien et al. They assume that the amount of waste discharge depends upon the upstream firm output. We shall assume that this is not the case. That is, assume that some activity, necessary for production upstream, causes an amount of discharge •, and that a change in the level of this activity does not change the level of Q•. Several different assumptions about the upstream production process could yield this result. So, whereas Kamien et al. assumed in effect that Q2 was constant and w was a variable, we shall assume that Q2 is a variable and that of an institution for exchange firm i will undertake no treatment, therefore letting y -•. The result is the classic problem of externalities. In the spirit of the externalities literature and Kamien et al. in particular, we shall assume that property rights are either given to the upstream firm, in which case firm 2 must bribe firm i to treat the waste, or, in case property rights are granted to firm 2, firm i must compensate firm 2 by the amount of the damage (the case of the tax). The authority is simply an agent that constructs an institutional means by which the transfer is made and the gains from exchange The equilibrium waste output will be the optimum y = yO. The constant A assures the authority tha• firm i will participate in the plan.
Assume now that there is a change in P2. We have thus established a case of asymmetry completely opposite to that of Kamien et Of course, the model can be changed to yield different results. This is just the point. There are many types of institutional and/or behavioral assumptions that will yield any type of results desired. There appears, therefore, to be no 'basic' asymmetry between bribes and changes, contrary to the assertion of Kamien et al.
